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Regarding the Most Recent Work
of Monsieur Flourens
and
the Origin of Modern Ideas About Life
Maurice Raynaud, M.D.
A book by Pierre Flourens is always an event because universal
acclaim always follows its appearance. This is only fitting. For even
though the author's academic rank is high, it is his consummate ability
that really accounts for this on-going success. Much like Fontenelle,
Buffon and Cuvier, M. Flourens is a versatile thinker who functions
within the great tradition of the Academy of Sciences. 1-3
In this light I shall recall that grand event when a belated testimonial was held to honor the memory of our illustrious colleague,
Magendie. 4 As always happens, a large gathering had formed beneath
the Mazarin cupola. But on this particular occasion, the audience
stirred more restlessly than usual because they knew the spokesman
for the Academy was M. Flourens. May I continue along this path for
a moment? That day, M. Flourens fortuitously proclaimed a great
truth. He said, "You were all made to live for at least 120 years. If
you do not reach this age, you have only yourselves to blame." 5 In
making this statement, M. Flourens echoed the sentiments of another
writer who once wished that "if (I) could grasp but one unambiguous
truth, (I) would immediately announce it to all mankind!" Yes, philosophers always curse intemperance and, yes, we always let philosophers have their say. M. Flourens added that, paradoxically, almost
every indulgent Frenchman wanted to read his book. Well, the size of
this group alone would have insured a fortune for this publisher!
The truly great scope of this new book, On Life and Intelligence,
demands a corresponding maturity in those who would consider it.6
Here, M. Flourens grapples with some of the most difficult problems
that link physiology with metaphysics, with those that surround the
broad aspects of life itself as well as the root manifestations of the
human intellect. Not only does he analyze the bonds that unite these
realities, but he also surveys the boundaries which separate them.
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(Later on, we shall consider how his success springs from employing
the experimental method, even though he virtually excludes data
- especially his own. Instead, he attempts to criticize. I suggest that
we try to recall this while we study the book, since it will be beneficial
if he proves to be accurate. ) Old facts and new insights - these would
seem to indicate a book of doctrine. Well, the book is indeed concise
and tightly written. In fact, its brevity can even be misleading. Finally,
let me say that the book contains the author's definitive conclusions.
Am I compelled to follow this same outline? I think not. Certainly
not out of loyalty. M. Flourens neither demands nor needs this kind
of devotion. His own approach involves tracing the opinions of his
predecessors (which, often enough, he rejects), drawing on his own
rich background and juxtaposing their formulations with his, as if to
say to the impartial public, "Here are their interpretations and here
are mine. Compare them and judge for yourselves." Again, it would
be mistaken to see in this book merely a critique of the old physiology. Certainly the author's great capacity for admiration should also
be emphasized. He is sympathetic toward all sincere and erudite work
even though he remains convinced that a valid exposition, even if
simple, sufficiently refutes errol'. We shall see that M. Flourens is, by
nature, little inclined to discuss. He is concerned more with verdicts
than with motives. Therefore, he would rather just decide.
The historical aspects of this book mesh easily with those of the
author's Academic Eulogies. 7 True, the science of life implicitly includes
everything but a book filled with names like Jussieu, Cando lIe, Cuvier
and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire is closely akin to those which recall names
such as Haller and Bichat. 8 - 12 But doesn't natural history include
physiology explicitly? Of course it does. Therefore, considerations of
life itself stand only a step away, ready to emerge from within this
same history through the logic of facts and ideas. Unfortunately there
is the great temptation to assist the author as he attempts all of this.
Believe that if I succumb, I do so only out of concern for exposing the
truth and not out of any desire for originality.
May I say a few words about the general format of M. Flourens's
writing? First, it does not elicit a tentative judgment. If it does not
quickly please, it never pleases. This is largely a function of an inflexible literary style which features an eloquence born from precision and
accuracy. Precision he establishes initially and then eloquence follows.
But I would hasten to exclude from this judgment the Eulogies, since
his subjects there are so broad and his touch so subtle and delicate.
Well, this is altogether permissible. The literary character of these
works allows M. Flourens to show a master's judicious resourcefulness,
disciplined verve and sober yet piquant grace. In all honesty, I wish
that his graceful presence at the French Academy was more widely
appreciated. Only the mediocre would be resentful.
May, 1981
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Second, his style is never flimsy. He never languishes. On the contrary, he is halting, precipitous and even abrupt. True, he exaggerates a
disregard for development and transition, those indispensable elements
of artful writing. (Indeed, M. Flourens has come to the point where he
constructs paragraphs from two lines and chapters from two pages.
Possibly this is an attempt to separate himself from undistinguished
authors.) All the same, those of his lines which tie " this" to "that" are
evident to those who have grasped his trend of thought but are ever
obscure to those who have failed to do so . I suspect that he intends all
of this in order to capture an aphorismic purity. By employing this
kind of style, he caters to the reader who shares with the man of
letters the pleasure of reconstructing a disheveled phrase . Unfortunately, though, he must trust the astuteness of the masses in so
doing, and this can be dangerous. The masses do not like to guess.
After experiencing the pleasure of understanding, they desire the additional pleasure of understanding why they understood.

I

We are ever mindful of those creatures upon whom nature calls to
play the dominant role in the universe. They exercise an influence
upon their physical surroundings that is far superior to that which
they, in turn , receive. They do actually dominate but retain , in so
doing, an enduring character and a distinctive individuality despite all
temporary modifications of form and circumstance. But the
immensely important observation is this : they are born, they multiply,
and after perpetuating the species, they die.
At first glance, the mystery of human life seems to have commanded the attention of observers from every age. Assuredly, a vague
sentiment of this type does indeed seem to have occupied the human
spirit from time immemorial, dictating the necessity of exploring life
itself - its boundaries, its conditions, and its functioning. But
curiously enough, the ancients never excelled in this undertaking.
Their poets virtually overflow with profound feelings about beauty
and about nature's inexhaustible fecundity and power. Yet despite all
of this, these movements of the spirit unfortunately became petrified
at the level of aspiration. Philosophy remained attached to poetic
ideas.
Now I want neither to retrace the well-known origins of the ancient
philosophers nor to survey that first long glance they cast upon
nature. Scientifically sterile though it was - owing to its unconcern
for limits - this vision was, all the same, as immense as the panorama
it beheld. No, nor do I wish to indulge in the pleasure of researching
the first outlines of physiology within the high speculations of
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Parmenides and Empedocles. Nonetheless, I must emphasize that this
ill-defined Pantheism managed to confuse the two elements comprising the universe - animate and inanimate matter. For within this
same vision, within this infant precursor of scientific thought, identical names and laws were indiscriminately applied to both classes of
matter.
This particular confusion disappeared subsequently, but only as a
preliminary to the rise of a more subtle and more dangerous confusion: accepting knowledge of man as the starting point for all
knowledge. As analytical philosophy entered the stream of positive
discoveries, the existence of the soul - its spirituality, attributes and
immortal destiny - all of this appeared, riding this crest of luminous
evidence. What also emerged was an abundance of proofs, and to their
cogency the ensuing centuries have added nothing.
I think that it all had to take place precisely in this way. I believe
that a demonstrable yet free and intelligent principle answered a
primordial need for a basis of morality. All the rest remained a matter
of curiosity -legitimate curiosity, to be sure, but a matter devoid of
urgency and a function of time and experience.
Confusion, of course, abounded. The study of man's morality
obscured all other studies by subsuming their respective provinces into
its own realm. Thus, the notion of life became confused with the
notion of soul, a misconception we still see reflected in all ancient
languages. Consequently, we have inherited all those most synonymous words, I/Juxr). fjUIlOS. 1I0U~ animus, anima, mens, spiritus and
many others, whose precise meanings still baffle the patience and
sagacity of the philologists.1 3 And this same characteristic vagueness was to remain an on-going burden, especially after attempts
at precise translation often ended by endowing almost synonymous
terms with almost contradictory meanings. Added to this hodgepodge
was the unfortunate vocabulary established through substituting
names of organs (which had supposedly been identified as the
seat of the unknown principle) for the name of the principle itself.
This occurred not only in the vernacular but also in the formal operations of the philosophers. Thus, lung, brain, heart, liver and diaphragm, each in turn, usurped this ever available role with an ensuing
chaos that you can well imagine.
Confused notions of "soul" and "life" are clearly reflected in the
work of a most famous ancient, Plato. Who could ever forget the
incomparable passage when Socrates, facing death, discusses with his
friends, individually, his own prospects for immortality?14 At that
moment, he attempted to prove that his soul was not a collectivity nor
a result, nor was it a report or a non-entity, comparable to the
harmony flowing from the music of a lyre. No, he told them that it
was instead a genuine principle, an indivisible entity - irrefutably
spiritual and immortal.
May, 1981
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But even here is there not a measure of ambiguity in the words and
spirit of the first ancient philosopher?15 Yes there is. So we willingly
concede that prior to the era of Hippocrates, and even during his own
lifetime, the study of life had never really been attempted by either
philosophers or physicians. The honor of primacy belongs to him
alone. Still we must recognize, in our attempt to analyze the ensuing
revolution, that Hippocrates functioned essentially as a physician and
never really aspired to any other role, but no matter, for this approach
was to be his chief asset. And yet, despite this great advantage, his
physiology was related to the medical practice of the day in the same
way that philosophy later on would be related to theology: it was
merely a servant and a rather neglected one at that.
On the other hand, this illustrious healer was able to visualize many
enigmatic dimensions of human existence as being integrated, such as the
capacity to resist morbid influences and the instinct to fight disease.
He bestowed upon these realities the descriptive terms 1/1 vx rf. q,V(1L5.
and IlJoPPwlJ .16 And yet we could pose fundamental questions even to
him: What are you? What constitutes your essential being? Where do
you really reside? By what primitive acts do you make yourself truly
manifest? We would find that he lacked both the answers and the
desire to search for them. This, then, is the real significance of those
autocratic theories of naturalism, coction, and crisis; they are merely
theories which were oriented to practicing medicine; oriented to the
art of curing, but oriented to nothing more.
"There are," he tells us, "certain Sophists - doctors among them who hold that one must know (in order to fully understand medicine)
what man in essence really is, how he was first created and what his
most fundamental being really consists of. Well, as far as I am concerned, the writings of Sophists are more useful to publishers than to
doctors. Only by observation from the medical viewpoint can we
obtain a certain grasp of man's constitution." 17 Therefore , one can
easily misunderstand the spirit and tendencies of Hippocratic dogmatism by looking for a corpus of physiological doctrine. The
elements . necessary for compiling such a work - anatomy, most
basically - were not yet available.
I had not planned on returning to antiquity to examine the vicissitudes in the science of man, but here we are. Yes, Hippocrates reigned
as master and master he would remain, despite the schools of medicine
that were to follow. His successors were abJe to add very little to his
teachings other than various approaches to approving or disproving
them. And for a long time afterward, only one man - Aristotle would critically penetrate within that profound mystery which is our
very nature. Now Aristotle was much too judicious to overlook that
fundamental distinction between "life" and "soul." Without attempting to force analogies too much, we can say that his famous delineation of the three souls is comparable to Bichat's theory of two lives.
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It represented the first attempt of this kind, and it was most
ingenious. The marvel is that this great distinction emerged from the
thought of a naturalist. We should also note that physiology and the
rudiments of comparative anatomy were also being born during this
same era.

But let us not overlook that great failure of Aristotle's philosophy
- his persistence in substituting logical concepts for natural realities.
His entelechies really hold to nothing tangible. To the substance of life
~Al]
they were what form is to matter - a relationship. Or, if you
prefer, a reason for being. In any case, they were pure abstractions.
Aristotle asks himself, "Is entelechy inseparable from the living
body?" And without daring to answer in the affirmative, he questions
further, "Does it participate in the same type of relationship as that
which exists between pilot and ship?" He then commands himself to
consider the problem no further, but no. He is finally led to his famous definition of t.he soul: "The soul, having the power of life, is the
first entelechy of the natural and organized body." We must confess
that this is a bit nebulous. 1B
Despite considerable chronological distance, the transition between
Aristotle and Galen is simple to make, because never have two
geniuses been so similar in approach and erudition. 19 A peripatetic in
both style and method, Galen goes so far as to copy his model even in
mistakes, useless distinctions, fastidious repetitions and subtle dialectics. But all is redeemed by his infinitely more practical orientation.
His "physiology" - if you will pardon my advancing that term - was
redirected from logic toward fact as he continually sought out confirmation through recourse to anatomy. (Actually, many rather complicated movements had prepared the way for this development.) At
the same time, he was able to preserve the nomenclature of his
predecessors as well as to lend emphasis to certain specific passages in
their writings. In addition, the dissection of criminals' cadavers was
being permitted at the Alexandrian school (for the first time) under
the encouragement of the Ptolemys themselves. (Needless to say, it
was this locale that Galen frequented .) Then too, he devoted a proportionately large section of his encyclopedic compendium to revisions of
Hippocratic formulations under the new name of pneumatism. And
finally, Galen's theory of the faculties appeared and became antiquity's definitive word on the principles of "life" and "intellect."
Through a marvelous show of ability , he divided these "faculties" into
three categories: first, blood vapors, which arose from the liver,
comprised the natural faculties; second, after having transversed the
heart and after having combined with a subtle quantity of the air
(which breathing had delivered), the natural faculties became vital
faculties; ultimately, the vital faculties, after having been expedited
through the arteries to the brain, became modified into animal spirits
May, 1981
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which were then capable of presiding over the higher function of intellectual activity .
It is impossible to remain indifferent to this striking system or to
gloss over the concrete character of the soul which the ancients perceived. We must also admire their grasp of the tenuous distinction
between matter and spirit, not to mention their facility for dealing
with these two categories of life, even though they had to fabricate
nebulous transitions. Also, we can discern within this same vision the
prominent position occupied by the gratuitous hypothesis. Yes, in
light of these circumstances, we can appreciate just how much a man
of his time Galen actually was, since he, like so many others, accepted
word answers instead of sorely needed reasons. Galen believed that
he could explain everything in terms of animal spirits as though he had
actually seen them. He then forwarded a fundamental principle that
accounted for every function. If questioned about nutrition, for
example, he would answer that nutrition was a neutral ability existing
in parallel with four qualities: the attractive one, which attracts
nutrients; the retaining one, which confines them during coction; the
assimilating one, which transforms nutriments into particles analogous
to the substance of our bodies; and, finally, the expuising one, which
eliminates the residues. This is what one had to be satisfied with.

We must therefore concede that this need and this facility for
explaining virtually everything away favored a distaste for methodology and a detrimental laziness of spirit. These same tendencies were
responsible for much of the inertia which allowed the doctor from
Pergamon to absolutely dominate the Middle Ages. Translated by
Arabs, retranslated from translations and modified by legions of commentators, Galen shared with Aristotle the privilege of reigning
almost unchallenged throughout 14 centuries.
We now come to the Middle Ages. This is such an unwieldy subject
that we should dispense at once with trying to discover that which we
shall not find there - a spirit and a taste for the physical sciences. Not
only had theology and jurisprudence become the great concern of all
philosophers and authors (and who could reproach them?) but they
also imposed on the sciences of observation inappropriate directions,
methodologies and conclusions. Instead of looking for facts in nature,
one looked for explanations in books, for physiology in syllogisms and
for physics in the Holy Writ. Then, as authority took precedence over
experience, it became less a question of finding facts and more one of
explaining books. And even when a fact was established, it became less
a question of relating it to natural truth and more a matter of reconciling it with Galen, Rhazes and Avicenna. 20 - 21 This era was the
heyday of occult qualities, of substances with forms, and of big words.
All ultimately added to the legacy of Galen an imposing monument to
ingenious erudition and intellectual contrivance. This era proved, if
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nothing else, that even when the methods of explanation disappear,
the need for adequate explanation has deep, imperishable roots. We
should be good sports, though, and not deprecate the efforts of the
medieval mind. We may even want to concede t hat they kept alive, in
a defective sort of way, a scientific curiosity and a critical spirit which
ultimately permitted science to emerge. Furthermore, as I have been
speaking in generalities, I want to render homage to Roger Bacon and
to his discoveries. I know of them only by reputation but I do not
wish to disparage them in any way.
By this time a unique doctrine had grown up in the shadow of the
University, which partially disavowed it, and alongside the Church,
which always condemned it. But this particular philosophy, which was
so well suited to the friendly souls of mysticism (and their predecessors), ultimately rendered services to science which would otherwise
have been attained only with great difficulty. I am referring, of course,
to alchemy, that bizarre phenomenon which has been so ably surveyed
by M. Figuier.22 My tampering with his recent achievement would be
impertinent indeed. Still, I do at least want to mention those aspects
of alchemy that are germane to the present discussion. This striking
doctrine, so universally propagated toward the end of the 15th century, takes us back to antiquity once again. For h ere we again encounter the view that life subsists, to some degree, in all material things;
that stones and minerals feed and multiply in the breast of Mother
Earth in a way that simulates those elemental movements that take
place within the depths of our own beings; that gold, being the
"perfect metal," represents mineral life in all its perfection. Consequently, drinking gold must represent the universal panacea, the key
to eternal health and the ultimate goal of scientific research. Do not
try to trace just how this quasi-doctrine of vital unity arose from
hypotheses which were rooted in that confused amalgam of palmistry,
sorcery and astrology. The task is quite futile. For the era which
spawned the rise of this hermetic philosophy was the 16th century,
one of those confusing epochs where one can find almost anything
one wants in science and in every other place, too. The cauldron holds
a little gold to be sure, but this is not the point. The relevant lesson is
that a spirited ingenuity blossomed from a lattice of shaky suppositions. Let us not linger here for too long. Hypotheses are important in
the history of science only when they serve as the soul of a particular
school or when they serve as the starting point for bigger and better
undertakings. Now the sciences of observation, more than the others,
are functions of tradition and method - two elements which were
absent during the 16th century. Therefore, we shall pass over the fantasies of that shameless charlatan and drunkard, Paracelsus. This man
would inaugurate his lectures by burning the works of Galen while
declaring that his own shoes knew more medicine than did the greatest
doctors of antiquity! Also, we shall pass over Van Helmont, whose
May, 1981
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intellect was infinitely more serious, profound and inquisitive. 23 His
personality, however, was effusive and mysticism-<Jriented. In addition, he arrived 50 years too soon. His archaei in no way resembled
the medicine of nature of Hippocrates or the spirits of Galen, or any
approach belonging to either his predecessors or successors.24 No, he
was concerned instead with imaginary beings and bizarre personifications of the occult, those fruits of an infantile epoch when most
superior systems were still growing toward maturity. Furthermore,
Van Helmont's real contribution lay in the field of chemistry where he
became during the Renaissance, what Raymond Lulie became during
the Middle Ages. 25 And, in fact, it is in chemistry that his name is
linked to some of the fundamental movements of that infant science.

II

The advent of modern philosophy also coincided with a new
beginning in physiology, although this was not the present era. Yet
even there we find these same two sciences becoming inseparable. In
marking its points of departure and arrival, this new philosophy set
out to consider the great question of method. God knows, this same
question has been greatly mishandled in recent times, and I am sorely
tempted to return to the tendencies of Bacon and Descartes and draw
parallels. 26, 27 But we must recognize that Bacon never directly gave
birth to a genuine school of thought. Harvey, who was his friend,
mocked him for this very reason. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that Bacon appreciated method as a goal, not as a means. This
orientation did not destroy the academic value of methodology but it
did change its objective. He redid Scholasticism in terms of sensuality
and empiricism in a way that hindered real insight into the nature of
life itself since these were rather peripheral considerations. No, this
was an orientation that could only have led to statistics of a higher
order. Bacon's philosophy has been wittily described as a system
whereby the Chancellor of England went to his window to watch himself pass by .28 On the other hand , Bacon was able to expound (in
rather admirable language) upon the new tendencies of the modern
intellect - tendencies which, generally speaking, proceeded better
than he did. In fact, they proceeded without him altogether.
As for Descartes, he has been juxtaposed with Bacon too often.
Worse, he has been juxtaposed in a manner that suggests a comparison
between truth and error. 29 Descartes scarcely knew Bacon . However,
when he did speak of Bacon - and this was only once or twice - it
was with highest esteem. Each was a genius in his own right. But their
eras, m entalities and societies were so dissimilar that a comparison is
not warranted. Still, they were, together, able to inaugurate no less
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than modern man's mode of perceiving which is based on observation.
Descarte's genuine superiority springs from the authentic foundation
upon which his philosophy rests. In heading straight for the principle
of all knowledge, which is the study of the soul, he gave spirituality a
scientific endorsement. But his success went further than this. He brilliantly demonstrated that matter is, in essence, infinitely less well
understood than had been thought. If anything could have discouraged science, it was this kind of mystery! Every day, while we manipulate matter, we inquire into its nature. Indeed, we are partially composed of it. Yet nothing is more essentially obscure. In order to grasp
its real character, we must view its expansiveness, the only property
which Descartes would accept.30 Could matter be a conglomerate of
infinitely small particles and imperceptible molecules? Can its dimensions be subdivided until we reach a mere mathematical point, itself
the very negation of expansiveness? Or, from the viewpoint of the real
scheme of things, can we conceive of a veritable expanse composed of
parts which have themselves no expansiveness? Expanse without
expansiveness - what unintelligible chaos!
By contrast, if I regard myself as a thinking substance, satisfaction
comes from this same free and direct grasp of the inquiry's objective.
This satisfaction is also enhanced by knowledge of man which, necessarily, becomes elevated so as to include knowledge of God. But
Descartes, genius that he was, fell into error by exclusively contemplating only one side of human nature. He then concluded that the
inert expanse in matter lay beyond comprehension. Consequently,
these errors have been attributed to his physiology and always will be.
For him, the reasonable and intelligent soul absorbed everything else.
The body became no more than a perfect machine with God directly
regulating its movements while the unreasoning animal became
nothing but a perfectly constructed clock. Some might therefore point
to his "animal spirits" as proof of his having had vitalist tendencies.
But I beg to remark that these "spirits" (a term he borrowed from
Galen) change roles here and in no way resemble what today are called
"vital properties." No, I am here concerned only with those qualities
which he attached to material objects. In fact, their role is strictly
mechanical. Emanating from the pineal gland, they come and they go;
they move and are moved; they push and are pushed, moving all the
while at inconstant velocities. But here there is never any question of
an active force or an intimate principle of renewal and conservation.
Interestingly enough, Bossuet includes a section on physiology in
his Treatise on Knowing God and Oneself, although it is nothing but
an eloquent commentary on the doctrine of Descartes. 31 He zealously
cries, "What an architect is He who erects a decrepit building but
implants a principle that stands up tall within it, even among the
ruins!" For Bossuet, the body was always a machine but the authentic
father of this mechanism was Descartes.
May, 1981
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Then too, Harvey had just recently illuminated the operation of the
circulation, an advance which brought with it a parallel increase in
attempts to employ physics in physiology. For half a century, seductive treatises relating to the actions of levers, fulcrums, resistors,
hydraulic apparati and friction-induced heat abounded. In fact, the
masterwork of Borelli succeeded precisely because theories of this sort
were brought together in an economy that was accessible to calculation. 32 But once they were brought to bear on the intricate phenomena of nutrition, secretion and nervous action, these theories
quickly became absurdly inadequate. For then it became necessary to
postulate collisions between molecules resulting in round or cuboidal
or pyramidal forms - whatever the theory demanded. Glands became
either sieves or filters, while the "vital spirits," now overheated by
continuous motion, required periodic restoration through respiration.
Finally, a variety of spirits became necessary - hot spirits, cold spirits ,
bitter spirits, malignant spirits, clumsy spirits and subtle spirits. This
pseudo-rigor reopened the door for gratuitous hypotheses and they
did abound.
Oh, how we are tempted to misappropriate limited knowledge!
Here we can glimpse three temptations to which we seem to be perennially vulnerable: first, misappropriating limited knowledge; second,
judging theories more by the effort we expend in pursuing them and
less by the light of the truth involved; and third, abandoning observation whenever it gives us results which are contrary to those we had
expected. Consequently, when the newly acquired data of the chemist
was added to this mechanical framework, we behold t hat the human
body became a distillery roughly analogous to an experimentallaboratory. Unfortunately, we are today returning to this very vision of
Descartes's, the vision which Sylvius reintroduced into science under
the guise of iatrochemistry. 33 Ultimately , does it matter if we invoke
reactions and fermentations in order to cast light on the secret of our
nature? Are humors, putresences, alkalis and acids inferior to the phenomena of simple propulsion? Probably not. From one point of view,
this approach is actually more logical: the "animal spirits" were
undoubtedly pure matter, for the theory specified their nature and
located their origin in the process of distillation! Therefore, the
human body having been turned into a chemist's laboratory should
not amaze us because we have already witnessed it having been turned
into a carpenter's workshop. Here the phenomena of the animate
served to explain the nature of life itself. But the soul became everything while the body remained inconsequential.
There was more to it than this, however . Nothing resembles modern
vitalism less than does the animism of Stahl which formulated bodily
activities exclusively in terms of the soul. 34 On the other hand,
nothing resembles the cosmology of Descartes more. Apply all of this
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to the microcosm of man and you will have the following: inert
matter with a spiritual soul; a cadaver vivified by reason; death
battling against life; and, decomposing matter in the presence of
immaterial unity. Thus, Malebranche pushed his master's doctrine to its
inevitable conclusion and denied any possible relationship between
mind and matter.35 He admitted to no influence by the soul over the
body except through the direct intervention of God. By contrast,
Stahl supported the theory of secondary causes operating in each
bodily action and - here is the difference - believed he could prove
his point. But he did not explain how this reasoning soul directs so
many hidden actions - that of the heart, for example, where the will
can neither initiate nor impede. Stahl never satisfactorily came to grips
with this. Along with many others, he supported the most unusual
interpretations while, at the same time, he sacrificed the multiplicity
of phenomena to the needs of an artificial unity. This being so, I
strongly doubt that he would have found flattering the unrestrained
eulogies directed toward him during the materialistic 18th century. In
addition, Cabanis was to gratuitously attribute to him the fear of persecution by orthodoxy, the same Caban is who says that the soul is
only a "catch all" word that is responsible for "digestion in the
stomach, respiration in the lungs, filtration in the liver and biliary
tract and mentation in the central nervous system." 36

III

The awareness of vital properties was introduced into the study of
man by Albrecht von Haller, a man whose glorious reputation rests on
this same magnificent advance. Furthermore, he linked this same idea
with the even broader vision of seeing in matter something in addition to inert expansiveness. Actually, the idea of studying matter as
force and quantity goes back to Leibnitz. 37 True, when he propounded the concept of force, he exaggerated an idea which should
have complemented (rather than absorbed) the concept of quantity.
And if recognizing a sort of virtual activity in matter was itself a
radically sterile insight, still, it did provide seed for sowing the natural
sciences which have sprung to life during these past two centuries.
Indeed, this same effort spawned a whole line of thinkers who were
concerned with the intrinsic energy of objects, objects which suddenly
possessed futures. From Haller and Linnaeus to Buffon and Geoffroy
Saint-Hilaire, this school developed in parallel with that of the pure
Cartesians. 38 And ultimately, when the former assimilated the latter,
new and infinite horizons opene~ for the life sciences.
How was this great revolution accomplished? Through what phases
did it pass en route to our own era? How was the study of vital propMay, 1981

161

erties complemented by the study of organic forms such as genus and
species? This remains for me to explain. But here we encounter M.
Flourens who is no historiographer but who does at least provide my
explorations with an interpreter if not a guide. I refer you to the
second part of his book, "An Historical Glance at the Analytical
Study of Life." 39 But what I really want to do is survey the general
flow of ideas up to our own time. Then we shall inquire whether or
not the latest formulations of M. Flourens are, in fact, tenable.
The theory of vital properties, amounting to the analytical study of life,
was born at Montpellier at the hands of Bordeu. From Montpellier t h e
undertaking became transplanted in Gottingen where it was enriched by the
experiments of Haller. From Gottingen it then came to Paris where it was
further popularized by the writings of Bichat. 40

M. Flourens thus begins his survey. Then he renders a verdict:
This analytical study, which was popularized by Bichat, was then completed by my own experiments. 41

M. Flourens is therefore dealing with the vital properties and, in
effect, is opening up several new vistas. He is also mentioning new
names in addition to the greats who had already "staked out" the territory of experimental physiology. In turn, these newcomers are to
become just as ingenious as those whom we already recognize. In
addition, they are to acquire a more philosophically-oriented mentality and will establish connections with modern ideas. Buffon,
Barthez and Gall - these are the ones who necessarily occupy the first
rank here. 42. 43
M. Flourens subordinates the chronological order of facts to the
logical order of ideas. Thus he begins with Bordeu and demonstrates
(using the very best example possible) how a simple and powerful
idea, whether it falls within science or within one of the social stUdies,
rides the crest of circumstance, achieves maturity and finally asserts
itself.44 Bordeu was an audacious 20 years old when he dared to
attack "head on" in his inaugural thesis, the two established systems
- the animism of Stahl and the m echanicism of Boerhaave. 45 To the
first he delivered several strokes of pressing logic and subtle irony. To
the second he presented decisive experiments. The result was the
appearance that day of the animal spirits while the animal mechanics
were demoted to the second rank where they always belonged.
Bordeu's first thesis would have fallen short had it been a solitary
undertaking. But he wrote a second thesis which then was to bring
him glory. For here, in recognizing sensitivity, he established for the
first time a property without an analog, a property which did not
resemble weight or heat or electricity or chemical reaction or anything
present in inanimate objects in any way. But almost immediately ,
Bordeu went beyond the limits of his advance. He left " sensitivity" in
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general and pursued the particular "sensitivities" of specific organs.
Quickly, then, the word _"sensitivity" began to lose that precision
which originally had given it such force. Therefore, for Bordeu's pupil,
Fouquet, "irritability" was to become only a lost branch of sensitiuity.46 This linguistic artifice is then analogous to the manipulations
of Condillac since it allows the role of analysis to include the task of
synthesis."? Thus there were two men in Bordeu - the wise observer
who existed with the student of Montpellier, and for whom unity had
to emerge at any price. I myself would gladly consent to erecting the
structure of "sensitivity" over the ruins of animism but only on the
condition that this new edifice would stand supreme and to the exclusion of all others. For as long as science will exist there will be minds
inclined toward making analogies and unities, just as there will be
those inclined toward pointing out discrepancies. Montpellier
exemplifies the first tendency. In media uirtus. 48
How much more judicious in its proceedings, more independent in
its vision and more fertile in its results was the revolution of Haller
which was occurring at the same time beyond the Rhine! Haller sagaciously analyzed all the organs and all the tissues with no preconceived
ideas. This was a real departure from the approach of general
anatomy. And he discovered one consistently reproducible reality in
the midst of all transience. After carrying out hundreds of experiments over a period of 17 years, he proclaimed this great law: muscle,
and muscle alone (the gluten animal or, as we say, the organized
fibril), possesses the property of contracting, of shrinking under the
influence of a stimulus. And this property, which is distinct from
elasticity (that purely physical property), is irritability which, since
the time of Bichat, has been more reasonably designated as contractility.49 Conversely, every organ that contracts is a muscle, and
muscle is defined by contractility alone. M. P. Berard has remarked:
You will app rec iate the impetus given to physiology by the c larificatio n
of irritability if only you will imagine the chaos which had to be unraveled
at that time. Men like Baglivi were making a contractile organ of the dura
maier! This quasi-heart was imagin ed to be what kept the vital (or animal)
spirits in circulation by contracting and relaxing alternately. One believed in
the shortening of tendons and in the oscillation of nerves which were
responsible, in a mechanical way, for setting th e muscl e fibers to going. One
even believed in the contraction of the plexes that form the nerve n etworks
around blood vesse ls. 50

Haller then passed from muscle to nerve and recognized in nerve
alone the faculty of feeling. This property would eventually include
the capability of realizing precision and discrimination. Still remaining, of course, was the_ task of establishing the mutual dependence
between nerve and muscle, and here Haller was unable to gather
enough conclusive evidence to convince the physiologists. Adjuc sub
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judice lis est.51 But this question was of secondary importance since
the two terms had already been established and their interconnectedness would not further define the unique nature of either. 52 Thus,
when Haller established two of the fundamental properties of living
organisms beyond all question, he rendered to science a service worth
more than a thousand theories could provide. Indeed, in passing the
test of time, this great doctrine has successfully resisted contradictions, vicious exaggerations and misapplications: Cullen, Brown,
Rasore, Broussais - each of them reintroduced it, and in turn and
under various names and forms, into the study of disease according to
the needs of his respective cause. But even though systems pass away,
this doctrine endures with the indelible stamp of truth. 53-56
After Haller's ideas moved quickly into France, even the Montpellier School apparently considered compromising its beloved world
view. Whatever, Barthez, with much more resolve (and no experiments) attempted to make the principle of irritability the principle of
life itself. This is how he reasoned: the physician seeks to integrate
particular facts into more general facts. Finally, he attempts to arrive
at facts that are beyond any framework. To these all-inclusive facts he
gives the name laws. And, to the unknown forces by means of which
these laws manifest themselves, he gives the name properties. The
physiologist 's problem is exactly the same except that his facts, being
infinitely more complex, demand an analysis that is infinitely more
delicate.
Now what exactly did Haller do? Precisely this and nothing more.
And wasn 't Barthez seeking those same vital properties Haller had so
clearly defined? Yes, he was, and had he not been so preoccupied with
scholarship and doctrine - those ghosts of the tribe, as Bacon called
them - he too could have found them. What happened, of course, was
quite the contrary. Demonstrating nothing, he proclaimed the existence of a unique principle, which he named the vital principle, and
then deemed all biological phenomena secondary manifestations. He
did not feel obligated to define this entity or to determine what it was
or where it resided. He ended by substituting a word for that which
required an explanation. Don't ask whether this principle was inherent
in organs or had an independence analogous to that of the soul.
Barthez was pleased not to know. Actually he posed the question and
added that it was unanswerable. The remainder of his work, likewise,
should not be taken seriously for throughout its entirety he speaks as
though he believes in the isolated existence of this same principle. It is
this illusion that M. Flourens has exposed so very well:
.
We mu st s p ea k fr eely. Barthez constantly perso nifies his vilal prin ciple as
he himself ac knowledges: "Throughout the course of this work , I p e rso nify
the vilal principle. " He admits that h e does so in a n attempt to introduce it
into conversation more conveniently. But why p e rpetuate a langu age th e

164

Linacre Quarterly

reader will need to correct e ndlessly ? Wouldn 't it b e simpl er and more con·
venient to speak p recisely in the way that one wishes to be und erstood ? 57

Barthez's kind of language could bear fruit, of a sort, granted. It could
give us a uniformly speculative physiology whose ultimate expression
would be a text devoted to the function of organs which would never
be named! It could also bring us indirectly back to something even
more vague than the archaei of Van HelmonL To be sure, this imagin ary being, this veritable persona would have instincts, repulsions and
preferences. But then, when some sort of lethal force would challenge
the whole construction, the vital principle would then become indignant, the channels of conciliation would become exhausted and a
battle to the death would ensue. One of the adversaries would, of
course, succumb. Every battlefield sees its crops destroyed and its
houses ravaged, true. But here, the human body would provide the
battlefield and its deformed habitus would attest, especially after its
demise, to the terrible encounter that once raged there! Now M.
Flourens too has become a legatee of Montpellier. He has come to
possess a vision where a consensus of differing functions is brought
together in unity and where humanity becomes (via cause and effect
or principle and result) really organized, despite theories that make it
conceptually unmanageable.
Were this a lesson in physiology, I would now analyze the doctrine
of Bichat but su ch an undertaking is obviously out of place here. Still,
we should see where Bichat follows Haller. Albrecht von Haller distinguished contractility, the property of the living body, from elasticity,
the property of the inanimate. It was this insight that Bichat seized
upon and attempted to generalize. Thus, every organ (being material)
possesses, according to him, the general properties of matter and the
inherent properties of living things as well. There are, therefore, tissue
properties (dependent on texture) and vital properties (related to
function). He first posed this distinction in his Treatise on Membranes
but later extended it throughout the corpus of his work, making it
"the soul" of his general anatomy. But neither of these properties is
manifested consistently and both often appear simultaneously, and in
differing degrees. In other words, there are actions which man
accomplishes as man and, in addition, actions which are accomplished
within him. In the first instance, the will is active, while in the second
it is passive. It was Buffon who saw and articulated all of this: in each
animal there are functions which supervise its preservation, nutrition
and propagation. There are others, within a more elevated order,
which put the animal into relationships with the world beyond,
through intermediaries - sensations, thoughts and willed acts. In short
there is an interior and an exterior life, independent but subordinate.
Let us now backtrack. M. Flourens has held Bichat's manuscripts in
his very hands and has mastered Bichat's thought better than has
anyone else. 58 Thus he is eminently suited for showing to us the birth
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(to use his own word) of Bichat's doctrine and for distinguishing that
which Bichat borrowed from that which he himself introduced.
Actually, Bichat composed a whole body of doctrine after he had
adopted a hypothesis which had been thrown out in passing. By the
use of imaginatio n and penetrating analysis h e enumerated the
anatomical and physiological characteristics which belong to each of
the two lives, organic and animal. The vegetative possesses only the
first group . The animal (considered abstractly) contains those of the
vegetative life in addition to those of t h e second life . He then studied
the modifications and quantitative aspects of these same two lives
after general anatomy had cast a completely new light on the vital
properties. Finally , he put back together that which he had taken
apart. The two lives were not absolutely isolated from one another.
Reunited, they constituted the individual. How were they related?
Experiments were needed to answer that question and Bichat performed them with decisiveness and illumination. He establish ed the
mutual interdependence of the three great functions - the circulation,
the respiration and the nervous action. As long as these actions were
maintained , life existed. When one of them ceased to function, death
supervened. The death of one of the three sufficed to still t h e other
two. The brain, the lungs and the heart - these constituted the tripod
on which each life rests.
Encircled by that ubiquitous triple halo - youth, genius and misfortune - Bichat died at age 31. His theories were undoubtedly flawed
with imperfections, it is true. Indeed, M. Flourens has demonstrated
convincingly how a brilliant style could be substituted for fact by one
with an ingenious mind and a lively imagination. To be sure, everything does hang together in the natural order. All the same, his important distinction does hold up, although the separation of these two
lives is less complete than the theoretician himself would have wished.
Yes, his distinction has profoundly influenced the general character of
science ever since and has become the point of departure in contemporary physiology.
It seems to me that Bichat was the spiritual father of a great family
that can be divided into two branches, the physiologists of organic life
and those of animal life. As fruits of the former, general anatomy and
its offspring, microscopic anatomy, have opened up perspectives heretofore unsuspected. The studies of generation and of nutrition (which
is ongoing generation) have reflected an anatomy with a fresh new
countenance. Workers within the fields of embryology, organogeny
and histology are no longer content in considering tissues and organs
that are completely formed. Instead, they have focused on the very
process of formation. They have moved from considering "that which
is" to "that which is becoming." But isn't this the definition of life
itself, "becoming without ceasing to be?" I would think so. Finally,
this entire ensemble has been rounded out by the astonishing progress
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within the field of organic chemistry. We can see how Lavoisier gave
birth within this same field when he enunciated the great phenomenon
of gas exchange in the lungs. 59 Also, we can see how M. Dumas generalized the data of vegetal and animal in the formula "vegetals are
apparati of reduction, animals are apparati of combustion. "60 And
finally we can see how M. Bernard, who wished to sanction this doctrine through experimentation, paradoxically discredited it by discovering sugar formation in the liver.61 This one discovery gave science
such a radically new turn that it is now impossible for us to predict
what will happen next. As for the second group, the "physiologists of
animal life," they have given in our own time an enormous impetus to
the study of the nervous system. Who has not heard of Charles Bell or
Magendie? 62 Who has not heard of Gall, whose beautiful anatomical
discoveries will one day redeem his absurd phrenological system? And,
finally, who has not heard of M. Flourens? I will return to this shortly.

IV

We have just covered a fertile period during which great progress
was also made by those who worked within the natural sciences, and
heretofore, we have considered man almost exclusively. Now let us
study an enlarged ensemble of being, beginning with the least elevated
and least complex representative of this ensemble, the plant. Among
the life sciences, the field that is most expansive and varied, the most
simple and most congenial to a logical approach is botany. It is here
that inductive reasoning leads directly to fact, and too, here that
theory finds expression in practice. Consider, for example, the organs
within any random specimen. The transitions are so well integrated,
and the analogies so apparent, that one idea easily leads to another,
and then to another. It is here that truth is never encountered in isolation.
Let us also consider the species. The intimate but obvious relationships so common to so many species alert us to the possibility that a
common type of relationship exists here. Our minds, sensing that they
are on the right path, strain ahead. Yet what we really need is a genius
to illuminate the richness of this situation. Once again, M. Flourens
emerges. In the second volume of his Eulogies he projects this exhilarating spectacle as he brings to life again the personalities of Bernard
and Laurent Jussieu, Desfontaines, Labillardiere, de Candolle, DupetitThouars and Benjamin Delessert. 63 - 68 Thank God we no longer live
in that era when it was fashionable to compare the classifications of
Linneas with those of Jussieu in order to advance the supposed
superiority of the Frenchman. Now a more enlightened criticism
recognizes the more natural approach of Linneas. And even though he
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recognized only a small number of plants, he nonetheless had the good
sense to prepare the definitive categories of "genus" and "species."
Subsequently, these categories became the keys to his whole natural
method. Thus, he was the unequivocal and indispensable precursor of
Jussieu. Then, having established this link, M. Flourens analyzes this
same natural method - just as he analyzed the doctrines of Bichat.
Further, by focusing on the origin of this link, he also allows us to
appreciate the milieu of Bernard de Jussieu, the first great name of
that dynasty. Actually, Bernard did nothing but compile a catalogue
of the Trianon gardens and write a few letters. Yet M. Flourens has
traced the history of his hero's ideas by drawing on these same few
letters and on family documents which he collected with a great deal
of trouble. We thereby learn about Bernard's intimate association with
his . nephew, Laurent (whose accomplishments would one day surpass
those of his uncle), and about the step-by-step advances of this great
joint enterprise.
In retrospect, we can see that 1789 was a great year for botany. The
publication of Laurent Jussieu's Genera Plantarum itself marks the
beginning of a genuine revolution. Indeed, before this event took
place, characteristics had been counted. From then on, however, they
would be considered. At the same time, Jussieu bequeathed to us that
great principle of the subordination of characteristics. Henceforth,
common sense would perpetuate what genius alone could initiate.
What can we say about this great scientific revolution that has not
already been said a hundred times? Probably nothing. Still, let us follow the flow of ideas. First, Jussieu showed that the structure of the
embryo would reflect the form, size functions - in short, the life of
the plant that was to emerge. This same reality was seen from a different angle by the great German poet, Goethe, whose vision inspires us
even to this day. 69 This marvelous genius impressed his seal of originality and invention on everything he touched, in science as well as in
literature. He was the first to grasp the analogy that exists between the
reproductive organs of animals and those of plants. He extended this
analogy from cotyledon to ovula. But this analogy is not merely conceptual. Its validity can be convincingly demonstrated by utilizing cultures. One can transform a leaf into a branch, a branch into a calyx, a
calyx into a corolla and a corolla into a stamen. Any difference
between these organs is a difference of degree only. And the flower,
the carpel, is no more than the final stage in a long series of miscarriages. But this "failure" reflects the striking phenomenon of a concentrated, intense and vital activity that actually becomes reproductive. The sexual organ is diminutive in terms of form but multiple in
terms of power.
Let us move on to subsequent developments. Pyrame de Condolle
designated a somewhat broader concept as "degenerescence." He
beheld separated forms in young plants which then moved toward a
168

Linacre Quarterly

"

greater unity in the adult flower. Thus he was able, through morphologic study, to conceive of a vast and beautiful botanic destiny: all
plants gravitate toward a symmetrical prototype. But this idealized
form is never actualized. Not only are there "monstrosities" within
each species (unique culturing yields correspondingly unique monstrosities), but in addition there are entire species which are themselves monstrosities. Or, stated in another way, all species tend by
degree toward a normal prototype which the mind is compelled to
envision. Again, it is culturing that allows us to develop the missing
structures and to generate the forms which are empirically abnormal
but conceptually more perfect. The pe[ory, for example, is an
acquired monstrosity.70 Yes, nature presents forms which awaken in
us the idea of geometrical counterparts even though she never presents
a perfect circle, a perfect triangle or a perfectly straight line. Thus the
botanist leads us to the abstract but definitive idea of anticipating a
whole series of higher forms. Here I mean organic forms which only
indirectly become apparent.
Now this general outline has been abstracted from M. Flourens's
own book. What we cannot abstract though, is this author's originality
and gracefulness. His civilized tone projects a science that has popular
appeal but no vulgarity. Indeed, few things are more difficult than
achieving balance in the histories of intellectuals since one here must
integrate lives with works. Indeed, when this is attempted, the thinker
tends, all too often, to disappear behind the conceptualizations that
dominated his existence. Nonetheless, this balance is exactly what M.
Flourens creates. He leaves ideas in the foreground but explains them
by utilizing considerations of the writer's character. Each eulogy is a
portrait where ideas and personal habits are etched with exquisite
proportion. Each living portrait is an ongoing kaleidoscopic drama.
For example, the milieu of the Jussieus is captured with exceptional
freshness and charm. This calm household is seen admitting outside
influences which then blend harmoniously with the gentle rhythms of
domestic life. How skillfully M. Flourens contrasts this oasis with the
turbulent world beyond, with its social turmoil, its annoying rumors
and its revolutionary passions! How touching is the fraternal (I almost
said "patriarchal") celibacy of Antoine and Bernard - the one providing revenue and the other providing prestige for the household!
Yes, and after Antoine's death, we can see how he was replaced by a
nephew who likewise commands our affection and admiration! First a
student, and then a nurse, this fine youth helps the practically blind
old man across his dear flower beds and asks in return, only for the
elder's reflections on literature. The uncle, of course, is no less admirable. He recognizes the growing genius of his nephew and puts the
riches of his own genius at his disposal. He voluntarily instructs the 22
year old professor who, days before, was his student and who, days
later, will be the intellectual master of all Europe.
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The other portraits of Flourens feature the same pleasing tones and
subtle nuances. We can appreciate the naive savageness of Labillardiere
and the inexhaustible activity of B. Delessert, that Mycenian of
science, that patron of every worthwhile project. 71 This colorful
knight of the botanical world possessed personality as well as heroic
ideas. And finally, in addition to beneficial information, this book
provides examples of the world's two most important qualitiesgenius and virtue, united within individual personalities.

v
I am tempted to analyze zoology in some detail, too, but this might
exhaust you, who are my readers. Actually, M. Flourens has already
done this in his readily available Historical Eulogies. Furthermore, the
writings of Cuvier have so captured attention that we need only to
consider the aftermath. Precisely what did Cuvier propose when he
created comparative anatomy? Just this: he made it possible to assign
to organisms places within the realm of being by virtue of their structural characteristics. Thus we learn that the characteristics of both
plants and animals possess unequal value. Like money issued in two
different metals, one group of characteristics serves as a fixed standard
while the other fluctuates with circumstances. And here again, the
hierarchy of characteristics provided a thrust for methodology. A key
characteristic was seen as shedding light on an infinity of other characteristics. Thus, from a tooth and a bony fragment, it became possible
to reconstruct an entire animal and to deduce with fair certainty its
diet, its instincts, and its contours. At the same time, the great theory
of lost species emerged from this foundation, and even geology,
through the use of restored fossils, became magnificently crowned by
comparative anatomy. But despite the majestic unity of this particular
method, method itself remained merely method.
So let us now look at conclusions. How was the great question of
the unity and continuity of the animal kingdon resolved? Once again
Cuvier won out, this time with a glorious victory over Geoffroy SaintHilaire. Indeed, the notable debate between these men (before the
Academy of Sciences) was so recent that recounting it is
unnecessary.72 So let us look elsewhere and consider nature as a great
living ladder, rising by imperceptible transitions (natura non tacit
saltus) from the simplest plant to man, the dominator of creation and
the intermediary who fuses matter and spirit.73 Well, this idea is the
most brilliant poetical error the system-oriented mind ever spawned.
Among moderns Leibnitz originated this same vision which brought
such glory to Charles Bonnet and such eloquent defense from M. de
Blainville. 74 - 75 But I shall concede that this creation did render
immense services to science since it did encourage elaborate investiga-
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tion and patient research. Also, it effectively re-established an infinity
of transitional forms which, doubtless, would otherwise have gone
unrecognized. And finally, it was valid - but valid only when applied
to animals of one particular group. When extended to the entire realm
of created being, it was simply not valid at all.
Now let us here consider Jussieu once again. It was he who showed
three parallel patterns of botanical organization based on multiple,
solitary or absent embryonic cotyledons. These basic configurations
were then related to a multitude of other characteristics such as organization of the stem and preponderance of either five- or three-flowered
verticils, etc. Now Cuvier, whose methods so closely resembled those
of Jussieu, also matched him in compiling results. He showed the
necessity of recognizing at least four major categories of zoological
organization. 76 Then, within each of these groups, he showed how
secondary types emerged, types which might vary profoundly
although not essentially. These types could not be superimposed
because they were seen to be of different orders. But although the
first was more developed than the second, the most perfect representative of the lower order went far beyond the least perfect member of
the higher order. Well, this puts us on the path of a still more expansive idea regarding the fecundity of nature.
Now let me explain how the word "perfection" is used by those
conversant in natural history. The lowest form of life involves indistinct functions and properties as well as simple organization. Take, for
example, the amoeba. It seems to be nothing but a drop of mucus,
with neither nerve, nor muscle, nor blood, nor lung, nor heart. But
each section of the organism is endowed with all of its properties, even
though each of them is rUdimentary. Then as we ascend the developmental scale, we find that functions (and organs) begin to be differentiated. The physiological enterprise becomes more and more divided
while vital activity becomes more and more concentrated within
special apparati. These apparati, in turn, seem to acquire energy quite
in proportion to their degree of specialization while the subordination
of apparati proceeds according to the same laws of proportion. When
each part then becomes self-sufficient, it can then be isolated with
impunity.77 The obligations stemming from a collective existence
therefore render hierarchy ever more necessary and integrity ever
more indispensable. One should therefore not expect to find in
animals an absolute perfection. The word " perfection," when understood in this sense and when applied to matter generally, loses its
usual connotation. This is what I want to clarify.
Let us move on. Now the most false of all natural philosophies
holds that in order to encounter perfection in nature, it is necessary to
find perfect creatures. Beware of this view. It leads to a demand for
nature's inner secret - the reason why the all-perfect God has proMay, 1981
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duced a universe which, of necessity, cannot be perfect. Instead, isn't
it more consoling and intellectually satisfying to view nature as an
immense and harmonious unity in which everything is perfected by
being properly located? When it is considered in this way, the universe
no longer comes into focus as a sort of ladder but becomes, instead, a
vast, rich and unalterably beautiful empire where nature playfully
entertains itself by producing every form imaginable. Thus, nature is
limited only by organic incompatibilities and absurdities, as Cuvier
points out. 78 But nature does, in fact, adapt existence to every conceivable environment. Mollusks can live outside water while mammals
can become aquatic. And yet, neither random mating nor the caprices
of civilization are ever really able to break through the limits which
separate those forms which are actually related - even dependentbut which are, organizationally speaking, profoundly dissimilar.
If this much is clear, then we need not emphasize morphology any
longer. No more must we behold, through the eyes of a crude
nominalism , the life sciences as being mere "games of nature."
Through absolute ignorance were we told about the "essence" of
creatures and about "forms" which were the manifestations of divine
thought. This kind of revelation involves an ideal that is, supposedly,
more real than reality itself. Indeed, it is certainly possible to become
lost in a dream world of abstraction where there is neither motive nor
demonstrable hypothesis. But by the same token, do we ever, in this
world, do anything but search for ideals? Indeed not. And if someone
objected to ideals as eternally unfulfilled, as mere idle imagining, I
would object to them and ask: is justice itself merely a mythknowing as we do, that the justice of the Stoics, say, never actually
came into existence? Let us never abuse our theorizing but let us, at
the same time, never cease looking for the truth. We need not cry out
with the Greek philosopher, "7TaIlTet PEEl ."79 Visions which
obliterate contours and reveal only rubble can indeed make us skeptical and afraid. But there is always available a more noble vision
which can reassure and enlighten us. No, the currents of moving matter are not random and, yes, everything does pass on. But everything
moves directionally within the harmonious totality of existence. Like
a divine breath, life circulates throughout the universe. It does not
exist in the confused and random manner which antiquity misperceived: "Mens agitat molem et magno se corpora miscet. " 80 Life does
not precipitate into bodies, disperse itself, and then become annihilated. By contrast, bodies embrace it in order to become idealized - if
that can be said. No longer do we grasp for an image of life within a
vague and fleeting vision. Science has given a body and a countenance
to life itself. Life, so invariably fixed and so infinitely varied - life is
spread in every direction and dispersed amidst millions of discernible
forms, each endowed in every manifestation by the force of infinite
reproducibility. And even more exhilarating, this untold diversity is
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arranged in perfect harmony! Closely related molecules come together
to form tissues which come together, in turn, to form organic structures. Then these same apparati, which are living matter, become
almost analogous to the force of gravity as it relates to the centers of
inert bodies. No, our eyes behold neither species nor genus, class nor
kingdom. But our intellects do behold these realities which are no
less concrete and substantial than those we see and touch. Each particle of matter comes and petitions for its place at the great banquet
of living individuality. Once matter becomes resituated, new properties emerge and move in new directions. Yet the fundamental forces of
nature are in no way annihilated in the process. Within this inexhaustible torrent of life, each individual particle of matter acquires (in
proportion to its degree of assimilation) a summum of vitality which
cannot be surpassed. And then , once it is beyond this zenith, matter
becomes dissimilated, moves out among more diffuse currents of vitality, and comes to serve some other existence which will lay claim to it.
At times, the mixing of species does appear to create new forms which
deviate from the prototype in order to prevail under altered circumstances. But this detached tributary either runs dry or ultimately
returns to the great channel from which it originated. Thus, the sum
total of living matter remains nearly constant though in a perpetual
movement governed by Providence. Oh, an individual, a species, an
entire genus, or an enigmatic transitional form can succumb, as the
debris layered in terrestrial deposits testifies. But then a new genus
appears, as if to bring variety to this dynamic spectacle of creation
where everything remains but where everything is renewed.

VI

Now let us confine our attention to Monsieur Flourens. Perhaps our
circuitous route has reached its destination after all. Has M. Flourens
been faithful to what the title On Life and Intelligence implies?
Frankly, I think not. If I am not mistaken, such a title suggests that
some problem has been solved. However, when no solution emerges,
his book, like so many others, becomes no less than perfidious. True,
he does provide a partial solution, but this kind of sin is even more difficult to pardon.
Now M. Flourens has written eloquently on the history of the life
sciences and has offered eulogies of naturalists and doctors in the style
of Fontenelle. He has also given a highly regarded course at the College of France on 19th century natural sciences. What I am trying to
say is that M. Flourens knows better, and expresses better, everything
that I have thus far tried to present. But suddenly the naturalist and
anatomist disappears and we are left with a physiologist who is only
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concerned with experiments. He tells us that "for a century our entire
physiology has been a mere repetition of the physiology of Haller.
Consequently, it is time to formulate new - or, at least, clearerideas about what it is that separates life from intelligence." And further on, he informs us that he is "delivering a mass of new and original
material to provide that which has been lacking - perspectives for the
physiologist and facts for the philosophers. " This is what he says and
his tone has already brought him criticism. As I have mentioned, his
book is dogmatic but I think that this merely reflects the confidence
that is born of conviction. I do reject his conclusion, opposed as it is
to all of his previous conclusions, but I accept the rest of his offering
and wish only to find proof of its validity.
The substance of his first section, en titled "On Life ," is this. Some
forces contribute to the exercise of life by governing matter while
others do the same thing by maintaining form. "The great secret of
life lies in the permanence of forces amidst matter which is continually mutating." As a matter of fact, this does define one biological
phenomenon, nutrition. But there is another side to the question and
in the second section, entitled "On Intelligence," he provides a new
analysis of the vital properties. Personally, I would have preferred his
placing everything concerning life in the section on life but I will
gladly waive condemnation. So let us modify his aphorism and accept
it. But is this vision really novel? I think not. As I have maintained,
studies in comparative anatomy long ago established the constancy of
form in both species and in individuals. The remainder of M. Flouren's
hypothesis is therefore a mere commentary on Cuvier's famous
passage:
Th e direction of p e rpetually turbul e nt life, complicated as it is, remains
constant as does the kind of mol ecules involved . But the individual mole·
cules themselves, the ac tual matte ,· of the living bod y, these do not remain
constant and, by contrast, cease to ex ist. And yet, the deposito ry of force
will constrain emerging matter to move in the same general direction. Thus,
bodily form is more esse nti al th a n bodily matte r since the lat ter changes
endlessly while the former remains constant. 81

This profound passage is indeed remarkable. Indeed, it is this that
Cuvier maintained at the outset and this that his entire work merely
develops. But M. Flourens wanted experiments so he borrowed those
of Spallanzani on the reproduction of salamander feet.82-8 3 I beg
your pardon, but these particular experiments seem distinctly
inappropriate. The changes resulting from amputating a member are
less relevant than those which occur within a healthy member where
form endures but where elements change unceasingly. We may need
proof of the renewal of matter but we do not need proof of the persistence of form. This is a self-evident reality. Seeing bones, ligaments,
muscles and nerves faithfully reproduced is an extraordinary experien ce, true enough. Indeed, the really extraordinary phenomenon is
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reproduction itself. Yes, the reappearance of one lone epidermal cell
in a higher animal therefore merits the extended reflection of physiologists. But we need not be so extreme. Is there any greater marvel than
the fertilized egg consistently reproducing the characteristics of its
species? I, for one, need no other experiments. But what did Spallanzani prove? He showed that the ability to reproduce mutilated parts is
inversely proportional to the height of the animal in the developmental scheme. That is to say, it is proportional to its centralization of
apparati. In a dog, this ability is virtually nil. Each isolated piece of a
water polyp, however, can reproduce an entire organism. This
phenomenon, of course, should not be overlooked. But the experiments of M. Flourens would make this repair faculty one of the essential characteristics of life, whereas it actually decreases as one ascends
the developmental scale. And we could also say a lot about the very
curious phenomena of aberrant plasticity. One part of an organ can
become elongated, hypertrophied or deformed without any discernible cause! Thus, there are many cases where life is maintained while
both living matter and form change incessantly, too.
Let us therefore look at the central issue. How do we prove the continuous renewal of matter? Perhaps by the madder-root and related
experiments which are published in his study, The Experimental
Theory of Bone Formation. 84 Now these are decisive experiments
indeed. We note that a suitable diet can impart to bone a distinctive
color. Then, after we have used a platinum blade, we can observe in
the bony sections a ring which appears first on the outside but which
moves, with the passage of time, inward. Thus, without ceasing to live,
the bone loses on the outside what it gains on the inside. Yes, all of
this is clear, certain and conclusive. But M. Flourens exaggerates the
substantial impact already made by these experiments. Haven 't we
possessed for a long time irrefutable proof of what his latest experiments merely confirm? I think so and cite such obvious examples as
the ingestion and assimilation of food, the exchange of gas in the
lungs, and the expulsion of azotized end-products of combusted matter via the kidneys. Aren't these experiments proof enough that
molecules pass continually through the entire organism? I think so.
Granted, the experiments of M. Flourens have demonstrated that in
bone this passage takes place in a constant and determined direction.
And, along these same lines, I could go even further and state that his
experiments suggest that the same probably applies to all the other
organs. But has he the right to conclude so quickly that all matter in
every organ grows and disintegrates, appears and disappears, throughout the entire organism? No, indeed.
Now if some antagonist were to propose that neither glands
(secreting the digestive juices) nor the nervous system (presiding over
movements of the nutritive process) could be subjected to the moveMay, 1981

175

ments which they themselves direct, well I would then favor the
hypothesis of M. Flourens instead. But has the alternative hypothesis
yet been proven absurd by experimental physiologists who themselves
fail to take into account the data of natural history? I think not.
I am not deceiving myself as to the character of my current role. I
am bringing forward many objections but no alternatives. Still, I have
no choice. May I not express at the same time both admiration and
skepticism about remarkably precise experiments 'Which have nonetheless eventuated in the formulation of shaky conclusions? I would
hope so. And isn't knowing how to doubt an integral part of science?
Indeed it is. Nonetheless, this role is painful and I ask a little
indulgence.
VII

M. Flourens moves on smoothly to a study of the nervous system.
Let us follow him over this new terrain. I have mentioned how he considers life and intelligence and how he tries to separate them . I must
mention, too, that he has had access to ample resources for studying
the nervous system, a fact which perhaps attests to the inadequacy of
each of them in isolation. Let us take note of these. First, he has had
access to gross anatomy. But here the normal landmarks are difficult
to discern since the organs are so soft and delicate. Also, it is difficult
to preserve the modifications which were impressed prior to death in
these delicate post-mortem specimens. Second, he has had access to
comparative anatomy, a rich area which reflects the parallel development of function and structure and which allows us to further delineate function by highlighting structure. But this discipline involves the
great difficulties of establishing analagous parts (in fish, for example)
and of being unable to distinguish decisively the lower (more poorly
differentiated) creature from the higher (more well differentiated)
species. Third, he has had access to human pathology which
approaches the functional lesion from the perspective of organic
alteration and which allows us to learn the character of normal function through studying the manifestations of deranged function. However, extremely complex lesions have all too often meant that this
science has frequently provided contradictory findings. Still, it does
allow for a certitude that is out of proportion to the paucity of its
established facts. Finally, he has had access to experimental animal
physiology. M. Flourens has stated that this setting permits the study
of disease carried out under controlled conditions. Consequently, he
has adopted this means of exploration to the exclusion of all others.
But this should not go unchallenged. For despite the services they
unquestionably render, the vivisectionists are not without their liabilities. They place the experimental animal in a milieu that is com-
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pletely artificial while they substitute abrupt interventions in the place
of the slow, inexorable progressions of authentic diseases. Moreover,
they necessarily mutilate the exposed organs and profoundly alter the
animal's life which then must irrevocably end. And yet we must
express our gratitude to M. Flourens for having standardized the protocol in the operator's manual. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the
authentic physiological existence of an animal is never simulated when
its skull or vertebral discs have been removed to expose its brain.
The final conclusions of M. Flourens emerge with admirable unity
even when the inevitable shortcomings of methodology are taken into
account. He recognizes five principal properties of the nervous system
- sensitivity, motoricity, coordination of locomotive movements,
intelligence and the life principle - and supports his conception of the
properties with a series of summarized experiments as he attempts to
locate each of them in a specific organ. R5 Now it would be impossible
to discuss these experiments individually so I won't try. And, by the
same token, it would be foolish to challenge M. Flourens's consummate ability to vivisect. Therefore, I shall accept his findings, overall,
and shall speak of the data as he first set it forth.86 Hopefully, the following is a succinct and accurate resume.
First, sensitivity resides in the posterior columns (faisceaux) of the
spinal cord, in the posterior roots of the nerves and in the entirety of
nerves derived from this root (racine). Second motoricity - the
property of directly provoking muscular contraction - resides in the
anterior columns of the cord, in the anterior roots of the nerves, and, to
some degree, in the entirety of nerves deriving from this root. These
two conclusions reflect the fine work of Charles Bell and of Magendie
and have been overwhelmingly accepted by the scientific world. 87
Third, the principle which coordinates the locomotive movements that
spring from the anterior columns of the cord resides in the cerebellum.
Now prior to M. Flourens, no one ever suggested this fact which today
is accepted by the majority of physiologists as well as by me. (I would
also here reject totally Gall's view that the cerebellum presides over
physical love and of Magendie's view that it presides over forward
propulsion.) Fourth, a double function is carried out by the medulla
oblongata. This structure, the bulb, establishes communication
between the spinal cord, on the one hand, and the brain and cerebellum on the other. It links volition, as well as coordination, with the
immediate production of movement. Also, by virtue of a small quantity of grey matter situated in its posterior aspect, it serves as both the
motor and regulatory principle of respiratory movement. Through this
structure, the medulla exercises a direct influence over respiration, over
circulation and, consequently, over all life. This one point was hinted
at by Lorry and Legallois and has virtually no spatial extension. 88. 89
M. Flourens has defined its existence with far greater precision and
has designated it much more precisely as the "vital knot. " Finally,
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intelligence, the principle which presides over the perceptions and
volitions and, properly speaking, over all psychic life, resides in the
brain. 90
M. Flourens then draws his first interpretive conclusion. The
properties of the nervous system are mutually exclusive. The organ
which houses one does not house the others. Yet at the same time,
there is subordination. The brain presides over everything which is or
which depends upon intelligence while the " vital knot" presides over
everything that is life.
Now let us examine this postulation. Can we really localize in an
absolute and exclusive manner, even in the light of these experiments,
the properties of the nervous system? No, we cannot. I have said that
the anterior columns of the cord are the seat of movement and that
the posterior columns are the seat of sensitivity. But what about the
brain? Can we concur that the brain is profoundly and absolutely
insensitive? Well, in the normal state this is undoubtedly true. Anyone
who has craniotomized a living animal knows that one can trim, pick
and lacerate the brain without having the animal display the least sign
of sensitivity. But subject the brain to the slightest inflammation and
note the dramatic sensitivity that ensues. Any excitation, any jolt
provokes atrocious pain. I am even more amazed that M. Flourens did
not make this distinction because he very clearly established, in the
volume I am quoting from, that fibrous tissues, such as ligaments, tendons and aponeuroses are perfectly insensitive in the healthy state but
extremely sensitive when inflamed. This same is probably true of the
brain. 91 We can therefore see that the brain is not " profoundly and
absolutely insensitive."
And is movement completely alien to the brain? No, not completely. M. Flourens alleges that the spinal cord, which contains the
pripciple of movement, contains it completely. It is there and nowhere
else. The brain contains only the intellect and the will. But the will
here is seen as the occasional cause of the movement principle. The
logical extension of this would therefore be that a brain lesion should
abolish the will and a cord lesion should abolish movement. Studies in
pathology show us, however, that the second proposition alone is true.
As a rule, a lesion in the cerebral hemisphere affects neither the intellect nor the will. Instead, it abolishes or diminishes movement in the
opposite side of the body. ~ 2 To explain the persistence of intellect
and will, M. Flourens will doubtless propose an experiment which
pretends to establish the unity of the intellect by considering it in
terms of the unity of the brain. We will examine this shortly. But a
sufficiently plausible explanation is this : When the connections
between the seat of volition and the seat of movement are interrupted,
the influence of the one on the' other becomes impossible. Yet even
this explanation, apparently so plausible when a lesion sits at the root
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of the hemispheres (next to the bulb), is not plausible at all in the
numerous cases where a complete paralysis results from a very superficial lesion. The paralytic always wants to move but, time and again,
he does not move! Thus, the organ of movement here is healthy and
the organ of the intellect is diseased , a situation that runs contrary to
the theory of M. Flourens. We must therefore conclude that the brain ,
too, is motor in nature.
To repeat this first point, then, the brain is neither absolutely insensitive nor is it absolutely removed from movement. We could advance
other evidence to support this position but this seems to be sufficient.
Also, this same argument can serve to establish that the principle of
coordination of voluntary movements which resides in the cerebellum,
is exclusive neither of a certain sensitivity nor of a certain motoricity.
VIII

I consider M. Flourens to be more fortunate in situating the intellect exclusively within the brain. Indeed, it does appear to reside there
in its entirety. In a series of remarkably clear and well controlled
experiments, he has demonstrated that when a light stimulus impresses
upon the retina, sensation moves through the four medullary tubercles
and perception occurs in the brain. Consequently, there are three
ways of rendering an animal blind - by eliminating visual stimuli or
sensation or perception. Perception (the idea) is therefore seen to be
more than just sensation that has been transformed. When this fact
became established, then the scaffolding of Locke and Condillac was
sent tumbling. 93 M. Flourens went one step further, however, and
added that the unity of the intellect could be understood only in
terms of the intact organ. Successively remove several slices of brain
and observe that all the mental faculties persist. But excise the brain
entirely and observe the disappearance of them alL Suppress one
faculty and all are lost. Revive one and all return. Thus, they all somehow hold together. The organ is one and the intellect is one.
I do admit that few theories are more appealing than this one. It
appears to support strongly that most congenial philosophical dictum,
the unity of the self But let us look at the facts. First, these experiments were all conducted on chickens and pigeons, a regrettable situation, since these animals can hardly qualify as models of intelligence.
Relatively speaking, they are lower animals whose unique functionings
are not applicable to those species that are higher on the developmental scale. Second, we can cite many factors that flatly contradict
the apparent validity of this theory. From his theory one can infer
that a large brain component is usel~s if removing it brings about no
apparent consequence. But this argument is drawn from the consideration of final causes and I would like to dispose of it by citing the vast
May, 1981

179

testimony of comparative anatomy. Here, despite several exceptions,
most of the evidence demonstrates that intellectual development is
related to brain development! Par.e.on the crudeness of this image, but
this parallel suggests that where there is more cerebral substance, there
is more space for the development of mental faculties. Third, we see
innumerable patients who possess very restricted lesions but who lose
the entire intellect. Fourth, we must consider the innumerable idiots
whose brains present no perceptible alteration. In the light of M.
Flourens's theory they should have the same capacity as everyone else.
Fifth, and finally, we must recognize the numerous cases where a
limited lesion involves a partial loss of intellect (such as the memory)
or, even more curiously, a partial memory loss (such as substantives,
places, etc.). 94 This is all very well established and therefore detracts
from the validity of M. Flourens's theory no little bit.
Within this context, then, what can we say about anatomical integrity? Well, seeking to establish philosophical truth with this kind of
evidence is dangerous, I can tell you! If one employs the studies of
organs in order to substantiate supportive arguments, one must also, in
justice, study the implied arguments there that are, at the same time,
detractive. But no matter, because the dictum of the unity of the self
doesn 't really need this kind of support. As I see it, a unique principle
with multiple manifestations - such as the intellect - can, with regard
to these manifestations, flow from the organ 's anatomical variation.
Therefore, I ask M. Flourens to allow me this judgment. Even though
he recognizes the unity of the intellect with unexcelled vision, he
projects a conception that is too materialistic. Rather than allowing us
to conceive of it, he makes us imagine it. In concluding that unity presupposes indivisibility, he seeks to establish indivisibility in terms of
the physical integrity of an organ!
Even though I am concerned here mainly with physiology - the
physiology of M. Flourens - I shall nonetheless touch briefly on a
psychological error that really is rather crucial. In the tradition of
Malenbranch, M. Flourens falls into the perennial error of confusing
the intellect and the will. Between the acts of judging and decidingor, as the psychologists say, between the operation of understanding
and the nisus of will - there is an abyss. I act after my intellect
accepts a motive, true. But my approval of an act does not necessarily
eventuate in my executing the act. This holds true in the material
order and even more so in the moral order. Is seeing the best path to
follow the same as following it? Indeed not. If it were , then intelligence would be a virtue and a bachelor's degree would suffice for
sainthood! Also, since I wish to avoid indiscretions, I will not ask M.
Flourens what he makes of affectations, of sentiments. These are not
sensations and do not, I presu~e reside in the posterior columns of
the spinal cord. Where then do they reside? In the brain?
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We now come to the vital knot. I call this "knot" the knot of M.
Flourens's entire system for when we encounter it, we must truly
struggle to untangle the important concept of intelligence from that of
life.
Now we have seen that every willed movement reflects three
elements: the will (primary cause) whose principle resides in the brain,
the motor impulse (immediate cause) whose principle resides in the
anterior columns of the spinal cord, and coordination whose principle
resides in the cerebellum. And yet, some movements are governed
only temporarily by the will while others occur in spite of it. For an
example, I can cite respiratory movements. 9 5 Here the crucial
elements are motor impulse and coordination. These properties flow
from a very restricted focus in the medulla oblongata, one which has
no linear extension. Below this point, the spinal cord can be cut away,
slice by slice, and even though its function is profoundly altered, respiration persists. In addition, the entire encephalon above this point can
be cut away and respiration persists. Other evidence also supports this
fact. However, leave the entire cerebrospinal axis intact but cut this
solitary point and death follows immediately.
Now M. Flourens was the first to grasp this important fact which,
were it his only discovery, would justify all the accolades he has
received. But he then goes beyond this observation and adds, " .. this
point is the center of all vital action. This is the 'vital knot. ' " Thus, he
creates a new property of the nervous system, life itself. In his scheme
of things life becomes a property, like sensitivity and motoricity. This
new property is focused in a specific organ, the "vital knot. " Life is
here and nowhere else. But let us return to our previous considerations
of the mind since they should be helpful in discerning vital properties
in the present context. What we must find is a primitive event that is
inexplicable and irreducible. Have we arrived at this situation here? At
this crucial focus are the principles of movement and coordination of
an entirely differen t order than those which operate throughout the
remainder of the nervous system? No, indeed. But before we go on we
should perhaps inquire about whether we are speaking of different
things. Are movements of the muscles of locomotion and those of respiration really different? Perhaps. We have already noted one apparent
difference - the cord governs movement only under the influence of
the will. Yet when this stimulus is removed, the "vital knot" governs
movement. But is this difference really as clear-cut as we would like?
The whole problem is rather delicate. The spinal cord is not only an
organ of transmission but is also a focus of movement. Under appropriate circumstances, activity does become evident. Thus, following its
separation from the encephalon, the cord apparently becomes excited.
Also, irritating a skin segment in this same situation is followed by
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muscular contraction although it is not necessarily those muscles that
correspond to the stimulated skin segment. Evidently this is a nonwilled movement following a non-perceived sensation. Marshall Hall
has studied this phenomenon carefully and has designated it reflex
action. 96 The spinal cord 's property of giving birth to it has been
designated excito-motor. This property resides in the grey matter of
the spinal cord. (Let me also mention that subsequent studies have disclosed that reflex actions playa very prominent and heretofore unsuspected role in maintaining the harmony of bodily action.) Consequently, physiologists today are unanimous in classifying respiratory
movements among the reflex actions. Air acts on the mucous membrane of the airway and provides the stimulus necessary for producing
movement. This is also how we explain the first inhalation of the
newborn (who previously had laid apneic in his mother's womb) as
well as continuous respirations during sleep when the will no longer
concurs. Yes, each of these phenomena proceed in the following
order: mucosal irritation, then non-perceived sensation, then nonwilled motor impulse, then muscular contraction. Contraction (being
essentially intermittent like the muscular activity of external life) soon
ceases and exhalation, a purely passive phenomenon, then occurs.
Everything then begins once again and always proceeds in the same
order.
But all of this can occur after the encephalon has been removed. It
takes place just as well (if not better) as previously because excitomotor power increases following the separaton of the cord from the
brain. Of course stimuli can still be transmitted because of the
integrity of the pneumogastric nerve. 97 But why is the portion of the
cord below the "vital knot" incapable of taking the knot's place? Perhaps because it does not receive any sensory nerves from the respiratory mucosa. Whatever, I merely want to draw attention to the relationship that exists between the "vital knot" and excito-motor power.
M. Flourens augments this analogy by contending that the latter flows
from the grey matter.
Next, we encounter the problem of trying to understand why the
movements of respiration are not brisk, jerky or irregular like those
which follow the stimulation of other reflexes. M. Flourens acknowledges the presence of a faculty in the medulla which not only produces but also coordinates movements. Actually, I see nothing special
or specific in this. Certainly I see no new property.
Now we return to our main problem. If a lesion of the cord or brain
does not produce death by paralyzing the muscles of locomotion, it
fails because these muscles are not directly involved in maintaining
life. By contrast, a lesion of the "vital knot" produces instant death
because it paralyzes those muscles whose action is immediately necessary for maintaining life. We must grasp this important distinction. To
say that the medulla is the seat of a principle whose capital function is
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essential for life is to say the truth. But to say that the medulla contains the principle of life itself is to assert something profoundly different. The validity of the first by no means implies the validity of the
second. If it did, we could just as easily say that the principle of life
resides in the heart. In fact, when we cut off the blood supply to the
"vital knot" - and this operation is relatively simple to perform - its
activity ceases and death rapidly supervenes. We could then conclude,
with apparent reasonableness, that life resides in the circulation
because circulation is indispensable for animating those organs which
are themselves indispensable for maintaining life! Who then shall
decide between Hunter, who located life within the bloodstream, and
M. Flourens, who locates it within the "vital knot"? Actually, both
opinions are valid provided they don't become mutually exclusive. We
can even lend support to the first view by quoting M. Flourens 's statement that totally suppressing the cerebrospinal axis fails to immediately suppress the circulation! 98 But all of this is extraneous. The
functions which participate in maintaining life are circular and it
matters little where you interrupt the circle as long as you interrupt it.
But M. Flourens is not content to put life itself in the medulla. No,
he also refuses to situate it in any other structure. At first I thought
that this was just a matter of semantics. However, I am no longer able
to question the intent of such a phrase as this:
I say intelligence as distinct from life because intelligence resides in an organ
where life does not reside and , reciprocally, life resides in an organ where
intelligence does not. 99

Then, further along, he states:
Intellige nce, then, is where life is not. And where life is found, intelligence is
absent. The organ of the one is not the organ of the other. 100

What? The brain separated from the spinal bulb no longer lives? It
lives so well that it does nothing but live! I shall grant that it probably
no longer presides over thought. But the cord, the nerves and the
muscles - they all live! Stimulate the cord and movement results!
Stimulate a muscle and it contracts! Indeed, the more one reflects
upon the ramifications of life, the less one is able to separate it from
death by the limits imposed by established systems.
Surely M. Flourens must see it this way because he says:
I distinguish the action of a unit from the fullness of that action. Each unit
draws neither its absolute life nor its absolute action from the medull a s ince
each part can be separated from the cord and yet live (or some time. Even
durin g this final interv a l it can be stimulated. It is only by degree that eac h
living and acting part fulfills its function. 101

There is here a timidity of language that should escape no one. The
fact remains that every organ preserves a certain vitality even after it
has been separated from the "vital knot." Thus, the "vital knot" is not
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the organ of life, it is the center of the mechanism of life among
higher animals.
An objection now arises: lower animals get along quite well with no
"vital knot," indeed, with no nervous system at all. Well, M. Flourens
seems to have anticipated this and replies that in these animals the
vital properties are mixed. But this is precisely the question. The fresh
water polyp lives without a " vital knot," the leech has one "vital
knot" in each of its component rings, while man has one "vital knot"
and only one. 102 Here we can see three levels of life manifested in
three remarkable forms. Can we say that one lives more than the
others? In any absolute sense? No, we cannot. They all live. But the
last is infinitely more perfect than the second, which is, in turn, more
perfect than the first. Thus, M. Flourens has mistaken an accessory
characteristic - the centralization of function, which relates to the
degree of perfection - for an essential characteristic.

x
I would like to conclude with a summary. M. Flourens confronts
two problems. The first involves defining neurological properties and
localizing them within specific structures. The second involves distinguishing between life and intelligence. Complementing Charles Bell, he
has separated sensitivity from motoricity.1 03 Furthermore, he has
located the former in the posterior columns of the spinal cord and the
latter in its anterior columns. He has also clearly distinguished the following: the immediate cause of muscle contraction (motoricity) from
the stimulating cause (the will) which resides in the brain; the production of movement from the coordination of movement, this being a
function of the cerebellum; and sensation (an exclusively vital phenomenon) from perception (a purely psychic one). Furthermore, he
concludes that he has separated intelligence from sensitivity (and
motoricity) by identifying, experimentally, the specific organs within
which each of them resides. I think that I have shown that this distinction is only partially valid because the entire brain embraces, in some
way, each of these three important functions. Finally, he sets out to
establish the definitive limits of intelligence, and of life itself, and
attempts to do this by appropriating these phenomena to respective
organs. I have tried to show that here he has failed completely despite
a brilliant effort. At best, he has succeeded in refining the important
but very general concept of life that has come down to us from Bichat
and Cuvier. Science will not benefit very greatly from this, however.
But is this to say that he has rendered no significant service, even in
this particular area? God forbid it! He has clearly established the
intimate interplay between the components of the nervous system as
well as the prodigious proportions of this system, a reality which
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should never detract from the unsurpassable importance of each component. In addition, he has underlined t h e mutual interdependence of
the nervous, respiratory and circulatory systems. I am being neither
condescending nor polite, only sincere, in saying that all of this is
most admirable. Moreover, I encountered h ere his wisdom and steadfastness in his treatment of every important philosophical question. I
really cannot exaggerate my praise, for it is h ere, where the ideas of the
intellectual dim, that the character of the m an himself becomes
apparent. Indeed, only an exceptional thinker would make this statement after arriving at an apparent certainty :
Here is ph ys iological proof of t h e inte ll ect's essential unity. Undoubted ly,
the phi losophi ca l proof is even stronger. But we mu st address each sc h oo l in
its own language and show t h ose who use physiology in supporting faulty
philosophies t h at such support does no t ex ist. On t h e other hand, to e mploy
phys iology is n ot to deny the realm of intuition. 104

Such a statement is worth more than a discovery because it reflects
a mind that is capable of making o ne that is really important.
Finally, we should mention one more delicate question, the one
regarding the intelligence that has been accorded animals. Surrounding
this great desidera tum of the philosophy of Descartes, we find the
same loft y ideas, the same wise appreciation. 10 5 Here M. Flouren s is
able to speak of man from the point of view of a naturalist and of
animals from that of a true philosopher. In striving for magnanimity,
man does not need to belittle the animals. Of co urse, we see that
reaso n and reflection constitute a chasm (between the animals and
man) t hat can never be bridged. "Animals feel , think and perceive. But
man alone has the power to feel that he feels, to perceive that h e perceives and to think that he thinks. " 106 And this is why less has been
given to man by way of instinct and why he has, in the realm of intelligence, such a capacity to acquire. Antiquity wisely held that the
Divinity was most pleased by the great spectacle of man in the throes
of misfortune. Well, I agree with them. The unco erced developme nt of
moral force has about it a greatness that is beyond all comparison. But
beyond this there is an even greater and more consoling vision . Man
arrives in this world morally and physically feeble and unarmed ,
limited in instinct but indefinitely perfectible. Both as a species and as
an individual, he is obliged to a battle incessantly against the dissolution of his organs, the misery that is conveyed by his senses and the
inadequacy of his faculties. But then he bo lsters his atretic m entality
by developing ideals and will power, and he sets out to conquer t hat
immortal empire of ideas, assaulting it head-on in a struggle that has
no end but the grave. Yes, it is this very spectacle t hat M. Flourens so
simply and so clearly shows to us, in the precise language of scien ce
and with the spare eloquence of fa ct.
I end with a t estimonial, the best that I can offer. If M. Flourens
has creat ed no important method, h e has at least renewed one. I refer
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to the use of not only observation but also experimentation in the
doing of philosophy. Beginning with Descartes, all of the 17th century
philosophers were physiologists. By contrast, all philosophers in the
18th century exaggerated the separation of the body and the soulthese which should be unified. But no, they applied analysis everywhere. Similarly, this present century, which has given birth to Kant
on the one hand and to Bichat on the other, has yet to see the
intuition of the philosopher united with the sagacity of the experimenter. I will not criticize this now, nor will I speculate on the future
- on whether it will ever let us glimpse the inner reality of that secret
bond uniting life and intelligence which is the profound mystery of
our nature. But I do know that the example of M. Flourens proves to
me that if ever a genius does truly grasp the meaning of "intelligence
served by the organs," that man will be a physiologist-philosopher. 107
May M. Flourens be that man!
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body is an interesting forecast of our present theory of internal secretion.
45. Hermann Boerhaave (1668-1738), of Leyden, was the leading physician in
Europe of his day. He systematized medical knowledge, clarified and expounded
medical theory and contributed immeasurably to the art of medicine through
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50. Pierre-Honore Berard (1797-1858) was a French surgeon and physiologist.
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5 L "Still the lily is subject to judgment."
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nervous system and muscles. The reactions of stimu lation and excitability, he
taught, led to excitement. This theory dominated medicine for one-quarter of a
century.
55. Giovanni Rasori (1766-1837) was the chief exponent of the Brunonian
theory in Italy. Renowned for a time, he ultimately [ell into disgrace not only
because his therapy was so unsatisfactory but also because of his conspiratorial
activities.
56. Francis Joseph Victor Broussais (1772-1838) was a French doctor who
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58. The definitive edition of Buffon's works, which he edited and published,
ranks among the most valuable services M . Flourens has rendered to science and
the humanities (R). (Just why Raynaud interjects this judgment here, in a discussion of Bichat, is not clear. )
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59. Antoine Laurent Lavoisier (1734-1794) was a Parisian who inaugurated a
revolution in c hemistry by clarifying the nature of oxidation. He also estab lish ed
the fact that oxygenation of the blood and elimination of carbon dioxide were the
essentia l tasks of respiration.
60 . Jean-Baptiste Dumas (1800-1884) was one of the most celebrated French
chemists of the 19th century. He became t h e permanent secretary of the
Academy of Sciences in 1868 after the death of Pierre Flourens.
61. Claude Bernard (1813-1878) was a French physiologist whose brilliant
theoretical and practical contrib uti ons form the philosophical and methodological
basis of clinical medicine today.
'
62. Sir Charles Bell (1774-1 842) was Edinburgh's great contribution to
neurology . His greatest achievement involved clarifying the structure and function
of the cranial and spinal nerves, Bell is dealt with in the third series of Flourens's
eulogies.
63. Bernard de Jussieu (1699-1777) was a physician and botanist who developed a botanical garden at the Petit Trianon at Versailles.
64. Laurent de Jussieu (1748 -1836) developed the principles that served as the
foundation of a natural system of plant classification. In 1790 he help e d to transform the Jardin du roi into the Museum Na tional d 'His to ire Naturelle.
65. Rene' Louiche Desfontaines (1750-1833) was a French botanist who
entered the Academy of Sciences in 1783. He was named professor at th e Jardin
d es plantes in 1786, His publications included a Catalogue of the Plants in the
Jardin du roi and Experiences w ith the Artificial Fertilization ot Plants.
66. Jacqu es-Julien Houton de la Billardiere (1755-1834) was a French botanist
who stud ied the plants of the southern hemisphere during the expeditionary
voyage of La Perouse. He entered the Academy of Sciences in 1792.
67. Louis-Marie Augert Dupetit-Thouars (1758-1831) was a French botanist
who enjoyed an adventurous life and who published vo luminous memoirs,
68 . Benjamin Delessert (1773-1847) b egan the first savings bank in Fra nce. In
1801 he founded the first cotto n factory and , in 1802, the first sugar refinery in
France. A botanist, he also founded several learn ed and philanthropic societies.
69. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) was a German poet, novelist and
playwright. He ranks among the most important and influ ential writers of modern
European li terature.
70 . I use the word "monstrosity" just as the naturali sts do but I wou ld prefe,'
to en la"ge the scope a bit. To get a c learer id ea of these natural deviations, let us
examine some closely related plants: the belladonna, the large comfrey, the
gentian and the primula. In addition to their ge neric characteristics all have five
petals, equally rel ated to the corolla, and five eq ual stamens. Now if we ta ke an
analogous series, we find that the figworl prese nts all the characteristics of the
primula except for the coro ll a which is irregular, an d except for the stamens,
which numbe r four. Th e fifth s tam e n h as bee n miscarried , a filam ent having bee n
le ft in its place. Th e same holds for the lamium album and its re lation to th e large
comtrey as well as for th e gloxinia a nd its rel ation to the gentiall. Similarly , the
uewnica is a (igwurl which has only two sta m ens and the sage is a lamium album
possessing two add ed sta mens. But within thi s series, the primula has no ana log
with four stamens nor have the gentian and the gloxinia analogs with two stamens.
These conf igurations rema in provisiona ll y absent. Nothin g in bota ny is more fre quen t t ha n these ser ies which di spla y uniform d eviatio ns (R).
.
7 1. Th .. My cf'nian f'1'<1, which reached its ze nith c irca 2ilO B.C., in vo lved a
Ilowe!'ing of Greek sc it'nce.
72. In July , 183 0, Goethe becam e so excited by thesf' quest ions that he
exc laim l· d to a f"i"nd, " Hav e yo u heard t he latest from France '? Th e volcano h as
t' ruptecl. The who le co untry is in flam es."
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His friend responded, "It's a sad chapter indeed. Has the royal family bee n
expelled?"
"Oh, it's not political," replied Goethe, "I am speaking of a session at the
Academy of Sciences where an intellectual revolution is in progress!"
M. Flourens mentions this conversation in his "Eulogy for Geoffroy SaintHilaire." The anecdote typifies the personality of the au thor of Faust (R) .
73 . "Nature does not make jumps. "
74. Charles Bonnet (1720-1793) was a Swiss naturalist and philosopher. He discovered parthenogenesis and was the first to use the term "evolu tion" in a biological context.
75. Henri de Blainville (1777-1850) was a celebrated French biologist.
76. Vertebrates, articulates, mollusks and zoophytes (R).
77 . I offer the following view for what it is worth. Certain diseases (the ataxic
fevers, for example) generate a certain independence in organs as they function in
relation to one another. Muscular fibers will respond to direct stimulation; capillary circulation slows down or accelerates without nervous modification , etc.
Doesn't it seem as though the living parts acquire, by some unknown decentralizing force, the faculty for isolating themselves? Just as the sick animal simulates
a lower representative of the scale (R)?
78. First lesson of comparative anatomy (R).
79. "Everything flows on." The quotation is from Heraclitus.
80. "The mind penetrates matter's large mass and agitates it." The quotation is
from Virgil and was included in the preface (avertissement) to De la Vie et de

l'Intelligence.
81. Flourens, De la Vie, op. cit., p. 23.
82 . Ibid., p. 24.
83. Abbe Lazzaro Spallanzani (1729 -1799) was an Italian priest, geologist,
biologist and experimental physiologist. Although not a physician, his contributions to medical science exerted an important influence on medicine.
84. Flourens, Pierre, Theorie experimentale de la formation des os, par P.
Flourens (Paris: J . B. Bailliere, 1847).
85. I must quickly reassure my readers about M. Flourens's sound spirituality
which is apparently compromised by this formulation. How can the reasoning soul
be exercised by means of a strictly material organ? This question touches closely
on the religious question of the union of soul and body and the physiologists
cannot concern only themselves with it. What is certain is that, in everyday existence, we cannot think without a brain. This alone justifies calling, even in physiological jargon, intelligence a property of the brain. This is how M. Flourens arrived
at the expression, "the organ that thinks." Still, h e is not one of Gall's disciples
(R).
86. Flourens, Pi erre, Experimental Research on the Properties and Function of
the Nervous System (1824) (R).
87. I will not mention the recently published studies of M. Brown-Sequard. His
important conclusions are still being studied and touch only indirectly on my task
here.
88. Anne-Charles Lorry (1726-1785) discovered in 1748 that the medulla contained a single point which, if touched, resulted in instant death.
89. Julien-Jean-Cesar LeGallois (1770-1814) discovered in 1812 that one point
in the medulla was vitally bound up with respiration such that to disrupt its integrity was to bring about instant death through respiratory arrest. He was also the
first to investigate the fetal circulation.
90. I am omitting what is peripheral in M. Flourens's hypothesis, namely those
curious rotatory movem ents, for example, which emerge upon sectioning the four
medullary tubercles. He was the first to really study these still enigmatic phenomena (R).
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91. Does this acc idental se nsitivity of the bra in really b elong to t h e brain itself?
Does it not resu lt instead from ramifications of large sy mpath etic nerves accompanying the ramifications of the interna l carotid artery? These bra nch es h ave their
sou"c e in the upp er cerv ical ganglion and have been well d esc rib ed by M. Hirschfeld wi t h the ingen ious n am e nerv i nervorum. G iven that th e b ra in h as previ ously
been inflam ed, Filaments from the large sy mpathetic n erve co uld perhaps ex pla in
t hi s interest in g ph e n om en o n. As far as I know, no one has as yet really dem o nstrated t his. I conclude that the brain is not insensitive nor will it ever be. Will w e
substantiate the sympathetics~ Aside from th e vagu en ess of this term, which generally serves to explain anythin g in ex plica bl e, we know of no sympathy except
that re lating one se nsitiv e organ to another sensitive organ. As for a sy mpath y
whose starting point would be in an insensitive organ, I do not know what that
could mean (R).
92. This occu rs b eca use the cerebral Fibers cross at th e b ase of th e sku ll (R).
93 . John Locke (1632-1704) was an English phy sic ian and philosoph er who
laid m any of the ep iste mologica l foundations upon which mu ch of mod ern
sc ience rests.
94. A d eranged wo m a n now in the Sa lp etriere enunci ates only two words :
m o nsie u r and madame. She combines t hese with a ser ies of words such as tw o,
three, four, etc. Thu s, she on ly utili z es ex press io ns that ev id ently h ave no re lation
to h er. This woman probably sustained a hemorrhage of the stri ate d bodi es (R).
95. Charl es Bell has hypothesized th at respiratory muscl es are animated by two
orders of nerves corresponding to voluntary and involuntary respiratOl'y movements (R).
9 6 . Marshall Hall (1 790-1 857) was an Edinburgh graduate who b eca m e a practitioner in Nottinghamshire. Despite his work on th e physiological changes that
accompany h emorrhage, on refl ex act ion a nd o n the pre- and post-capillary vesse ls
of th e arteria l a nd ve nou s system s, h e was n eve r honored with a major hospital
a ppointment.
97. M. FloUl'ens points out that the potency of the vital knot does not d epend
on th e integrity of the pn eumogastric nerve !"Oots. P!"Oof, he says, is that dissecting
these ne rves does not kill the an imal imm ediate ly . I consider this a grea t presumption . But in pursuing a definitive a nswer, wou ld it not b e bette r to s imul ta ne ousl y
c!issect both the pn eumogas trics and th e cord ? Actually , as long as t h e ce rebrospinal ax is is intact, other ne rves ca n take its place but only to a certain p o in t (R).
98 . Floure ns, Experimental R esearch , op. ci t., chapter XIII (R).
99. F loure ns, D e la Vie, op cil., preface (R).
100. Ibid.
101. Flourens, Experimental R esearch , op. cil., p. 19 5 (R) .
102. M. Moquin-Tandon h as ca ll ed th is zoonites (R) .
103. This is M. Floure ns's nomenclature (R).
104. F lourens, D e la Vie, op. cit., p. 53.
105 . A lso see M. Fl o Ul'ens's work, On th e I nstinct and In telligence of Animals
(R). (See D e I'ins tin ct, e t de I'intellige nc e des animaL/X [Par is: L. Hachette et Cie ,
185 1 j.)
106. Ibid. ( R ).
107. This is M. de Bon a ld 's exp ress ion (R).
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